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Shadow Warrior by Rajeev SrinivasanIndia, Innovation, Foreign Affairs: This is a podcast from the point of view of a resident of India who spent many years in the US, now teaching innovation, earlier a tech strategist Author: Prof. Rajeev Srinivasan
An Indian/Hindu nationalist perspective on world affairs; as well as on technology and innovation; conversations with experts and with people just like you and me. rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com Language: en Genres: News, News Commentary, Tech News Contact email: Get it Feed URL: Get it iTunes ID: Get it |
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Ep. 181: Annus Horribilis: G2, spheres of influence, Trump National Security Strategy impact on India
Saturday, 20 December, 2025
A version of this essay has been published by rediff.com at https://www.rediff.com/news/column/is-india-standing-alone-in-2025/20251222.htm2025 has been a disastrous year for the US, surely in foreign affairs and economics. The trade war, far from strengthening the economy, has shown the limits of American power: the capitulation to Chinese supplier power on rare earths, and a strategic retreat in the face of Chinese buyer power on soybeans, for example.The dramatic rise of Chinese generativeAI, which will undercut US Big Tech, is another problem. The US cannot afford to be the globocop any more, and the new National Security Strategy seeks a US withdrawal into ‘Fortress America’. It may mark the end of the vaunted ‘American exceptionalism’ as well as the ‘liberal rules-based international order’.In an earlier time, this would have led to the famous Thucydides Trap, but in effect the US has gone into an ‘anti-Thucydides Trap’ because it unthinkingly paved the way for China’s rise, seduced by the short-term benefit of low-cost Chinese goods while ignoring the long-term strategic disaster. In the 20th century, Britain collapsed suddenly, but it is merely a tiny island off Eurasia. I never expected continent-sized America to follow suit in the 21st century.Meanwhile, in a fine example of “manufacturing consent”, the discourse in the US is not focusing on the global problems facing the country, but on MAGA bullying of H1-B Indians and on the Epstein files, which, on the face of it, is a silly exercise in moralization. I believe it was Hermann Hesse who said something to the effect that Americans are not interested in morals, being content with moralization.But the entire kowtowing to China has serious implications for India. One of the pillars of Indian foreign policy for decades has been the idea that it is a strategic counterweight to China in the US’s calculations. But if the US has really ceded Asia to China (I recall President Obama saying as long ago as 2009 that the US and China would “work together to promote peace, stability, and development in South Asia”) then the famous ‘pivot to Asia’ is null and void.A couple of years ago, I wrote that the most obvious thing for the US’s Deep State to do would be to form a G2 condominium with China, divide up the world amongst themselves, and set up respective spheres of influence. This was predicated on America’s relative decline, and China’s economic and military rise to be, for all intents and purposes, a peer. I thought this would take a decade or more, but, lo and behold, the US is caving in furiously to China right now.In addition, I wrote about the surprisingly large and malign influence exerted by the British, whereby it plays a ‘master-blaster’ role, leading the US by the nose, usually to America’s detriment. Britain’s ‘imperial fortress’ Pakistan seems to be involved in every terror incident, yet President Trump’s new-found camaraderie with them (“here, some more F-16 goodies for you”) is yet another indictment of their twisted priorities.And Britain seems to be “winning”, too: on the one hand, they have finally defeated Germany, which they couldn’t do via two World Wars: the latter’s economy, its electricity grid, and its vaunted mittelstand and its automobile industry are in shambles. On the other hand, Britain is the one major European power that has not been defeated by Russia, so they think they can, conversely, defeat them. France (Napoleon) and Germany (Hitler) learnt otherwise.The pointless Ukraine War is bankrupting Europe; I wrote about how this is hastening the end of the European century and how ‘Europe’ is reverting to what it was through most of history: unimportant ‘Northwest Asia’. This could well also be Britain’s revenge against Europe, which it exited in a huff via Brexit: British elites have looked down upon Europeans all along.I mention all these not to show that I was somehow prescient, but that things we have been observing for some time are coming to a head: the US National Security Strategy is the capstone of the New World Order. And it seems to codify these trends: hegemony to China with Asia as its sphere of influence, the abandonment of Europe to its own devices, a focus on the Americas in a new ‘Donroe Doctrine’ (so to speak).In the background are continuing terror attacks such as the one in Sydney, murderous attacks on Alawites in Syria, the car bomb in Delhi, and the lynching and burning alive of a minority Hindu youth, Dipu Chandra Das, in Bangladesh by a frenzied mob. The world is not a safe place.There was also a defining moment: the US seizure of a Venezuelan oil tanker. Far from being a show of strength, this may well be an admission of weakness: Venezuela is no competitor, and this is like the US invasion of defenseless Panama some years ago. It is, however, a declaration that the Americas belong to the US sphere of influence (the ‘Donroe’ Doctrine).Sadly, China may demur: it views the Americas are adjacent to them (just across the Pacific) and have made inroads into many countries, including Panama, and ironically are funding a proposed alternative to the Panama Canal through Nicaragua, as well as a major Brazil-Peru railroad project (all the better to ship in raw materials from both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and to ship out “rubber dogshit from HongKong” back to them). Their $3 billion Chancay deepwater port in Peru has already been inaugurated.China is now a $500 billion trading partner for South America, overtaking the US, yes, overtaking the US. To top it all, the ports on both sides of the Panama Canal, i.e Cristobal (Atlantic side) and Balboa (Pacific side) are run by Hong Kong companies, which of course means the CCP does. In fact, it is blocking US firm Blackrock’s acquisition of these ports.China therefore has serious assets in the Americas, and large commercial interests. The US can pretend it is supreme in the Americas, but the reality may be a little different.Meanwhile, the US has more or less abandoned its Quad partners in Asia and acknowledged Chinese hegemony there: in other words, that half of the condominium is done. When the new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said something that was obvious and perfectly within her rights to worry about Japan’s security, the Chinese came down on her like a ton of bricks, wolf-warrior style. The normally voluble Trump said nothing at all in support of Japan.Regarding India, there has been a persistent tilt towards Pakistan during and after Operation Sindoor; and the imposition of harsh tariffs. The increasingly volatile situation in Bangladesh which is the result of a likely US-backed ‘regime-change’ operation is a significant security threat to India because of the collusion of jihadi, Pakistani and Chinese-proxy elements there and the very real concern about the cutoff of India’s Northeast from the mainland, apart from the ongoing murders and ethnic cleansing of Hindus and Buddhists there.Now comes the New York Times, which I generally despise as a propaganda arm of the Deep State. But they show some self-awareness in their editorial “America cannot win alone”. No man is an island, as John Donne wrote some years ago. And America is not a singular colossus any more either, and it needs alliances. It hurts me (as an Americophile) how rapidly the US is declining in relative terms, and perhaps even absolute terms.The best indicator of this decline is in the crown jewels of the US: its technology sector. On the one hand, the entire US stock market has been propped up by the Magnificent Seven and the alleged promise of the generativeAI boom. On the other hand, China’s patented “over-invest, scale up, get to be lowest-cost producer, drive competitors out of business” is repeating in industry after industry: the latest is automobiles, where the famous German marques are history.Trump’s surrender on Nvidia’s H200 chips is an indication that China is playing the trade-war game much better than the U.S. China has amassed a $1 trillion trade surplus in the first 11 months of 2025, an unprecedented feat that shows its trade power. Not only is this because of supply-chain dominance, but an analyst suggests it’s also because China is now on the verge of delivering a knockout blow to US/Western tech.There are news reports that China has almost managed to replicate EUV (Extreme Ultra Violet) lithography from ASML, one of the key areas in chipmaking that was beyond China’s reach. They used former ASML employees of Chinese descent, as well as less advanced technologies from ASML itself, Canon and Nikon.This is the context in which one has to critique Trump’s 2025 US National Security Strategy. In summary, it shows a narrowing of America’s expansive self-image, the beginnings of a ‘Fortress America’ mindset and an ‘America First’ doctrine. The ‘promotion of democracy’ is downplayed (aka ‘regime change’, as we have seen in Bangladesh. Thank goodness!) and fighting other people’s wars (think Ukraine) has been de-emphasized.It fits in very well with the G2 condominium idea, as it focuses on national interests and explicitly rejects globalism, elevates economic matters while suggesting the use of military might as an element of dealmaking, and asks ‘allies’ to shoulder more responsibility.Europe is downgraded, China is the prime focus with an emphasis on deterrence (e.g., Taiwan), supply-chain resilience and balanced trade, the Indo-Pacific gets short shrift, and the emphasis is on the Americas as, so to speak, the US’s private playpen, harking back to the 19th century.India gets almost no attention: it is mentioned four times as compared to 21 times for China, with the tone shifting from ‘strategic partner’ or ‘leading global power’ to a more transactional expectation of burden-sharing and reciprocity. The Quad is downplayed too. India will need to maintain multi-alignment (e.g., with Russia via RELOS agreements), diversify dependencies, and accelerate self-reliance. India is on its own, as I said in “The Abhimanyu Syndrome”. At least twenty-five years of wooing the US has gone down the drain. Back to the drawing board.At the beginning of 2025, I must admit I was optimistic about Indo-US relations under Trump’s presidency. I did not think the G2 condominium would arrive so soon, especially under Trump, or that the eclipse of the US would be so sudden and so dramatic. India had at least one bright spot in 2025: the rapidly-growing economy, despite US tariffs. I really can’t see much that went well for the US. Truly an annus horribilis. In 1999, I wrote that that year was terrible for India, but 2025 may have been worse for the US, in my opinion.Malayalam podcast created by notebookLM.google.com:1800 words, 20 Dec 2025 This is a public episode. 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