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Nerds for HumanityTakeaways from some of the best long-form podcasts / livestreams on Nerds for Humanity. Usually interviews with interesting and thought provoking guests about politics. Author: Nerds for Humanity
Takeaways from some of the best long-form podcasts / livestreams on Nerds for Humanity. Usually interviews with interesting and thought provoking guests about politics. nerdsforhumanity.substack.com Language: en Genres: News, Politics, Science, Social Sciences Contact email: Get it Feed URL: Get it iTunes ID: Get it |
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The 60-Day Coup: How America Accidentally Gave Presidents a Blank Check for War
Sunday, 4 January, 2026
Hello nerds.It’s been a while since I sat down and did what Nerds for Humanity was originally built for. Not shorts. Not algorithms. Not rage bait. But long-form, structural analysis of how power actually works in this country, and why things that feel shocking in the moment are often the predictable outcome of rules written decades ago.This livestream was about Trump’s military operation in Venezuela. But not in the way cable news framed it.I wasn’t interested in relitigating whether Trump is reckless, authoritarian, or dangerous. If you’re reading this Substack, you already know where you land on that. The more important question is this.How was he able to do it?How was a single president able to order a major military operation against a sovereign country, deploy massive air and naval assets, seize the country’s leader from its capital, and then inform Congress afterward?The uncomfortable truth is that Trump didn’t invent some new authoritarian power. He exploited one that has been sitting in plain sight for more than fifty years.And worse, he did so largely within the mechanics of existing law.The law that was supposed to stop thisIn 1973, in the shadow of Vietnam, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution. Its purpose was simple. Presidents were not supposed to be able to drag the country into war on their own.The law created two central guardrails.First, the president must notify Congress within 48 hours of introducing US forces into hostilities.Second, unless Congress authorizes the action, those hostilities must end within 60 days, with an additional 30-day period allowed for withdrawal.At the time, this seemed reasonable. Military action moved slowly. Wars took time to prepare. You could not overthrow a government in a weekend. The assumption was that Congress would have ample opportunity to intervene before anything irreversible happened.As I said on the livestream,“At that time in 1973 the thinking was well, surely no one can invade a country and capture the head of state inside of 48 hours. They would need weeks to prepare for it.”That assumption is now dangerously obsolete.We are using 1973 traffic laws for modern warfareOne analogy I used resonated with a lot of people.Trying to govern modern warfare with the War Powers Resolution is like applying 1970s traffic rules to autonomous flying cars.The law was written for an era of B-52 bombers, carrier groups, and weeks-long mobilizations. It was not written for drones, cyber operations, special forces insertions, precision strikes, and operations capable of destabilizing or decapitating a regime in days or even hours.Today, a president can dramatically alter another country’s political reality before Congress has even finished debating whether the notification email landed in the right inbox.The time-based trigger is the flaw. It assumes time equals restraint. That is no longer true.As I put it during the stream,“This time-based system is flawed. It doesn’t work for a world where you can basically destabilize and replace a regime in a few hours.”Trump didn’t invent this powerIt is tempting to treat Trump as a unique aberration. He isn’t.Modern presidents of both parties have steadily expanded executive war-making authority.George H. W. Bush built up a massive military force in the Gulf before Congress voted, and then received authorization shortly before the 1991 Gulf War began.George W. Bush secured a separate 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force to invade Iraq, and the post-9/11 era normalized expansive readings of both congressional authorizations and Article II authority.The Obama administration conducted extensive drone campaigns and the Libya intervention without a formal declaration of war, arguing that certain operations did not meet the War Powers Resolution’s definition of “hostilities.”Every modern president has pushed the envelope. Trump simply sprinted through it.As I said on the livestream,“This has been a loophole that’s been used by many presidents. We just relied on them to exercise judgment and honor the office. That honor code is clearly gone.”A system that relies on voluntary restraint is not a system. It is a gamble.Language laundering: from war to “kinetic action”One of the most revealing shifts has been linguistic.Presidents learned that if you do not call something a war, you do not need a declaration of war.So we get euphemisms.“Kinetic action.”“Law enforcement operation.”“Targeted strike.”As I pointed out,“They don’t want to say we are conducting warfare. If you don’t call it a war, then you don’t need a declaration of war.”This is how large-scale military action against a sovereign state becomes a “police-like operation.”If another country flew dozens of military aircraft into Washington, DC and seized the US president, we would call it an act of war without hesitation. Euphemisms only work when we are the ones using them.The public justifications kept shiftingThe administration’s public rationale for the Venezuela operation evolved quickly.Initial statements emphasized fentanyl and drug trafficking. Analysts and critics noted that available trafficking data does not identify Venezuela as a significant fentanyl source, which raised questions about that justification.Subsequent messaging emphasized cocaine trafficking and broader security threats, but those claims were also contested.What became clearer over time was that the operation was aimed at exerting decisive pressure on the Maduro regime itself.As I said during the livestream,“What some messaging from inside Trump’s orbit suggested was that this was really about regime change.”Trump later publicly discussed American oil companies entering Venezuela, reclaiming seized assets, and modernizing infrastructure as part of a post-Maduro arrangement.If that sounds familiar, it should.“That sounds a little colonial to me.”Because it does.The moral high ground is not abstractEvery time the US violates the sovereignty of another nation under contested legal theories, it weakens the norms it relies on to restrain other powers.As one viewer put it during the livestream,“I’m afraid the US just gave a license to Russia to take Ukraine and China to take Taiwan.”You cannot argue that international law matters only when it constrains other countries. Either it restrains power, or it doesn’t.Trump’s actions did not just affect Venezuela. They further eroded America’s standing in a world already drifting toward a more unstable multipolar order.This is bigger than TrumpOne of my core arguments, and the reason this livestream mattered, is simple.Trump will not be the last president to exploit this structure.Even if Trump disappears tomorrow, the authority remains.History shows that presidents, particularly lame ducks, often become more willing to take foreign risks once electoral constraints disappear.As I said,“We can’t rely on Trump or any president. Every president eventually realizes how much power this office has.”This is not about stopping one man. It is about fixing a system that assumes good faith in an era where bad faith is a governing strategy.How the law could actually be fixedThe War Powers Resolution does not need cosmetic reform. It needs modernization aligned with modern warfare.I outlined several possible approaches.First, scale-based triggers. Certain actions should automatically require prior authorization, regardless of duration, such as the use of specific aircraft types, large troop deployments, or major munitions thresholds.Second, target-based triggers. Actions aimed at heads of state, national command infrastructure, or critical civilian systems should never fall under a post-hoc notification model.Third, funding enforcement. If authorization is not granted, funding freezes. No money, no mission.As I argued,“Sometimes the US will have to use force. But introducing liabilities for the whole country should not be determined by one branch alone.”In corporate governance, CEOs cannot acquire companies without board approval. Presidents should not be able to remake countries without congressional consent.A simple test for candidatesThe good news is that this is a fixable problem.Congress can change this law.And elections create leverage.As I said on the livestream,“Now is a great time to ask every candidate one simple question. Do you support updating the War Powers Resolution?”Not a detailed proposal. Not a legal dissertation. Just whether they believe the current system is acceptable.If a candidate believes any president should have a 60-day blank check to wage war, they should say so plainly.The uncomfortable truthI said this near the end of the stream, and it bears repeating.“This is a known vulnerability in the system. It’s just time to patch the bug.”We like to tell ourselves that American democracy is protected by norms, traditions, and good people.But systems that rely on virtue instead of constraints always fail eventually.Trump did not invent this power. He stress-tested it.And it failed.Support the channelIf you found this analysis useful and want Nerds for Humanity to keep doing long-form work like this, consider supporting the channel directly.You can become a YouTube channel member to help cover operating costs and get a shout-out on every livestream.Thanks for sticking with the long version.Bye nerds. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nerdsforhumanity.substack.com
